Together with Professor Stephen Yeazell, I have already written about the three destabilizing attributes of Twombly and Iqbal: their doctrine is thoroughly novel, quite uncertain, and shakily resting on a foundation laid by a faulty legal process. 6 We fervently criticized the cases on those grounds, even though we were, and remain, agnostic on the question of whether notice pleading needs to be tightened. But the time for shock-and-awe commentary has passed. The time has come to think about moving forward. How will the new regime work?
One cannot figure out precisely what the two founding cases mean without ascertaining what they do not mean. Although I shall begin by provisionally summarizing the regime that the cases seemed to establish, I shall quickly shift to the necessary task of brush-clearing. I shall do that by refuting the three major myths that have arisen from misreadings of the two cases now seemingly prevalent in case and commentary. By way of prologue, then, it was a deeply worrying supposition about meritless claims inundating the courts and inflicting discovery burdens that pushed the Justices into action. Twombly and Iqbal added a pleading requirement for claimants that goes beyond having to give notice. Invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)'s "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," 7 the Court imposed on the plaintiff the burden of establishing, by nonconclusory allegations, the complaint's plausibility as to liability on the merits. 8 Thus the Court, by case decision rather than by rulemaking, blazed a new and unclear path for all civil cases heard in federal court. 
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THREE MYTHS ABOUT TWOMBLY-IQBAL 1339 remains cloudy, but it now appears that pleading should work in the following way. 10 First, upon a challenge to legal sufficiency, the judge should proceed in the traditional way for a demurrer by asking whether any legal claim exists that would be consistent with the words of the complaint-that is, the complaint must encompass a legal claim without including allegations that would defeat it. 11 Henceforth, however, the plaintiff must do more to identify the complaint's legal theories, as a practical matter, because the plaintiff must be specific enough for the judge to weigh the complaint's factual sufficiency under the next test.
Second, to satisfy the factual-sufficiency test, the plaintiff must plead facts and perhaps some evidence. 12 The plaintiff should give a particularized mention of the factual circumstances of each element of the causes of action. 13 The degree of particularization should be sufficient to make plausible an inference of liability, with the judge testing the plausibility not of each fact but only of the moving defendant's ultimate liability on the particular cause. 14 The judge performs the decisional task (1) by ignoring any conclusory allegation, such as a bald assertion that an element exists, and (2) after accepting the remaining allegations as true, by weighing the plausibility of the liability inference in light of his or her judicial experience and common sense as applied in the case's particular context. 15 This new approach will most seriously impact the plaintiff who needs discovery to learn the required factual particulars.
This simple summary has not, however, captured the minds of the citizenry. Instead, three widely prevailing myths lead to mistaken views that can seriously overstate or understate the cases' significance. Each of the myths builds on its own faulty premise, as I shall now try to show. .pdf (presenting a study prepared for the Rules Advisory Committee and stating that "it remains difficult to draw many generalized conclusions about how the courts are interpreting and applying" the pleading requirements).
10. 
I. MYTH #1: THE TWOMBLY-IQBAL COURT HAS REVIVED FACT PLEADING

A. Looking to the Past
Many observers have concluded that the Supreme Court has, in Twombly and Iqbal, readopted fact pleading for the federal courts. 16 Depending on one's vantage point, the Court either is thereby foolishly leading a march into the past or is finally correcting the modern mistake of notice pleading. But, regardless of the wisdom that such a move would reflect, it is in actuality clear that the Court has not readopted fact pleading.
How Fact Pleading Works
The place to begin is reconsideration of the nature of fact pleading. It arrived as part of the Field Code of 1848. 17 The new pleading regime's defining characteristic was its requirement for complaints to state "the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended." 18 More than history is in play here. Fact pleading persists today in a good number of states, 19 as well as in a number of federal 16 
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provisions. 20 The typical requirement adopted by the framers of the various fact-pleading states' codes is that a pleader should give a "plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action." 21 The parties were to lay out the facts appropriately so that the court could apply the law.
22
This mandate sounds simple. But vast accumulations of interpreting cases belie that simplicity, without yielding clear guidelines for decisions. What went wrong?
The code framers' most seriously wrong turn was their failure to realize that every statement of fact is both specified and generalized to some degree, because any description of a given situation requires selection and rejection of detail. The statement appropriate for pleading will depend on the objectives of pleading.
23
Fact pleading therefore came to require the claimant to plead only the "ultimate facts," choosing ones that together constituted a "cause of action."
24 "The pleader was not to 'plead his evidence,' for that was being too specific; nor was he to 'plead conclusions of law,' for that was being too general; he was to plead the 'ultimate [or operative] facts.'" 25 Does the lawyer "plead a contract by reciting that 'A said this, B said that, and so on' or by reciting that 'A and B mutually agreed such and such'?" 26 The standard proves quite unclear in application. The former allegation might be mere evidence, and the latter might be a legal conclusion. Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate the uncertainty. More than a century and a half of interpretation helps. Officially approved forms for common types of actions, and unofficial practice books with forms, offer further assistance.
29
Litigators and judges seem to have acquired a fairly good grasp of the level of factual detail that the mandate requires. 30 Thus, fact-pleading jurisdictions do manage.
Still, partly because of the remaining uncertainty and the resulting litigation, their version of fact pleading has tended to fade into a form that is sometimes difficult to distinguish from notice pleading.
31
Even the leading treatise on code pleading phrases the object of fact pleading as "fair notice of each material fact of the pleader's cause." 32 For the federal courts, of course, the rulemakers abandoned fact pleading in 1938, and the courts gradually adopted notice pleading. Although the comparative-law lessons are valuable for scholars, foreign practice is not sufficiently familiar to most lawyers and judges for the comparison to serve the practical purpose of providing a guiding hand through the actual pleading process. Moreover, foreign systems may not be an apt comparison because their pleading is more permissive where Twombly-Iqbal has the most bite: in the situation in which the plaintiff has no access to the needed information in the defendant's hands, the civil law does not require a high level of specificity from the plaintiff and instead often shifts the burden of proof and pleading to the defendant. See The simple fact is that civil-law pleading schemes do not serve a significant gatekeeping purpose. Those systems use pleading more as a way to start the case effectively, rather than as a way to weed out weak cases. Thus, they truly are more like old American fact pleading than like the Twombly-Iqbal innovation.
Cf. ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE princ. 11.3 (2006) ("In the pleading phase, the parties must present in reasonable detail the relevant facts, their contentions of law, and the relief requested, and describe with sufficient specification the available evidence to be WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
because nonconclusory-and-plausible pleading requires the plaintiff to plead particularized facts, the typical federal complaint of the future will look much like a complaint drafted under a fact-pleading regime. Therefore, some commentators have looked to fact pleading for illumination. But it provides none of the needed comfort or instruction, because the Twombly-Iqbal Court's approach is thoroughly new. Commentators who stress that the new and old pleading standards both required more factual detail than does notice pleading mask some big differences. The more useful message would be that the Court did not reimpose fact pleading. Three observations settle that point.
First, the Court expressly denied that it reimposed fact pleading. Twombly maintained that "we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 37 Indeed, the Court in Leatherman and Swierkiewicz had earlier refused to append any socalled heightened-fact-pleading requirement absent a special Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or statutory provision.
38
Twombly offered in support of their allegations. When a party shows good cause for inability to provide reasonable details of relevant facts or sufficient specification of evidence, the court should give due regard to the possibility that necessary facts and evidence will develop later in the course of the proceeding."); the ALI/UNIDROIT principle attempts to capture the civil law, but seems partially to miss.
Indeed There is no inconsistency between rejecting heightened fact pleading and adopting nonconclusory-and-plausible pleading, because the two are different systems: the former requires factual detail, while the latter tests for factual convincingness.
I nonetheless do not mean to conflate heightened fact pleading and classic fact pleading. The heightened fact pleading that the Supreme Court rejected differed from code-style fact pleading as well.
42
The heightened-fact-pleading courts were shifting more toward gatekeeping. They demanded a lot of factual detail, partly to discourage plaintiffs from filing claims. 43 Requiring greater factual detail also gave courts an excuse to weed out frivolous cases before discovery. (distinguishing the modern federal cases that adopted heightened fact pleading from earlier cases that required code-style fact pleading, on the ground that these modern courts did so for the purpose of excluding so-called frivolous cases, whereas earlier courts used fact pleading to narrow the issues at an earlier stage in litigation).
43. Indeed, the demand for factual detail under heightened fact pleading could sometimes exceed the detail demanded by nonconclusory-and-plausible pleading. [T]elephone and Internet subscribers brought a class action against various telecommunications giants, claiming an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade. Under antitrust law, however, parallel and even consciously identical conduct unfavorable to competition is not illegal if it comprises only independent acts by competitors without any agreement. The complaint alleged parallel conduct in great detail, explaining how each company sought to inhibit upstarts in its own region and refrained from entering the other major companies' regions. But the complaint alleged an agreement in conclusory terms based upon information and belief because the plaintiffs had no proof yet in hand. 45 Pleading the critical element of agreement merely by stating conclusions on information and belief, as Mr. Twombly did, would have been fine under fact pleading. Fact pleading permitted pleading elements of a cause of action on information and belief, as when the plaintiff lacked the needed information.
46
Fact pleading especially allowed conclusory pleading when the plaintiff had no access to needed information that was in the defendant's hands. 
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By contrast, the Court held Twombly's pleading to be insufficient under the new nonconclusory-and-plausible pleading test.
48
Third, the illustration of Twombly more importantly reveals the fundamental difference in purpose between the two pleading systems. The codes demanded factual detail as a means to focus the case early on, not as a means to convey factual convincingness. It required little more than an appropriate level of generality using the available facts. There were of course concerns with meritless complaints, but the codes' cure for such abuse rested with requiring verification of facts by the pleader and testing by demurrer for the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. 49 That is, fact pleading itself was more a judicial management scheme and not substantially a gatekeeping scheme. 50 Perhaps, in light of fact pleading's mixed motives, the best way to describe its essence is that it is not necessarily a gatekeeping regime.
Admittedly, as time went on, the fact-pleading regimes saw more and more testing of pleadings for insufficiency of factual statements, even if the testing was done in a rather modest pursuit of gatekeeping that an amendment could often circumvent. 51. See Clark, supra note 36, at 276-77 (discussing "reversions to pleading formalities recurring under code pleading"); Maxeiner, supra note 36, at 23-24 (characterizing the tendency to screen pleadings as increasing over the years following the implementation of the code-pleading system). WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 under common-law pleading 52 and notice pleading.
53
Unless the procedural system were to eliminate definitively all screening of pleadings, 54 the urge to keep the gate seemingly will increase with time, until a new round of pleading reform kicks in. This cycle helps to exemplify Judge Clark's aphorism that "every age must learn its lesson that special pleading cannot be made to do the service of trial and that live issues between active litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on the paper pleadings." 55 The new pleading approach of Twombly-Iqbal anticipates the typical decay by embracing gatekeeping right from the outset. And it does so in such an open and full embrace, by knocking out factually unsupported cases at first glance, that we can no longer ignore how inappropriate a function such gatekeeping is at the pleading stage as currently structured. Twombly-Iqbal calls for a judge to weigh factual convincingness without any evidential basis and with few procedural protections. Such a practice, in the absence of emergency or other special circumstances, offends our fundamental procedural principles.
True, insisting on nonconclusory statements and then testing for a reasonable inference, to render judgment as a matter of law, is not a method unknown at law-but officially authorizing judges routinely to do so based on only the complaint is an invention.
56
This gatekeeping invention truly distinguishes the new regime from both fact pleading and notice pleading.
How the Two Systems Stack Up
Ironically, if one were bent on tightening up notice pleading, 57 readoption of fact pleading would be considerably easier to defend than would the Twombly-Iqbal invention. 58 Modern academics were 52. See Clark, supra note 36, at 274-77 (discussing the disintegration of common-law pleading); Sherwin, supra note 32, at 296-97 (describing the encrustation of common-law pleading over time).
53. But fact pleading is not a crazy scheme at all, especially for a legal system in which discovery is underdeveloped (and even more so in a system without our sort of trials and our juries), and possibly even for the federal courts, which must contend with litigation very different from the litigation of 1938.
Much can be said in defense of fact pleading. 60 First, the fact pleader must think through the case: he must develop a tenable theory, ascertain what facts are necessary to support that theory, and perhaps conclude that the client has no valid contention. 61 Second, the clarification of issues required under fact pleading puts outer limits on permitted discovery, facilitates summary judgment motions, and streamlines the trial. 62 Third, the detail required under fact pleading "facilitates the application of the doctrine of res judicata." 63 Most convincingly, fact pleading looks good in comparison to nonconclusory-and-plausible pleading. It would not be nearly as novel, uncertain, or destabilizing. First, it is an established system, with which we have lots of experience, and it works pretty well. Second, it is a system that its practitioners understand, which would spare us years of wandering in the "nonconclusory plausibility" bewilderness. that fact pleading requires without imposing dangerous practices such as gauging probability on the basis of a bare paper document, and fact pleading would not have the undesirable effect of knocking out meritorious cases when the plaintiff needs discovery to unearth the required factual particulars. Of course-even assuming the need to tighten up notice pleading-to say that fact pleading might be preferable to TwomblyIqbal is not to say that resurrecting fact pleading would be a good idea. The aforementioned experience with fact pleading that led to the federal reform of 1938 suggests that fact pleading tends to work out in ways that are far from optimal. Moreover, the modern champions of gatekeeping could too easily co-opt any resurrected version of fact pleading and turn it to their purposes.
B. Generating Subsidiary Myths
The first myth might be losing its importance as it dies a natural death, that is, as experience with Twombly-Iqbal makes obvious just how different the new doctrine is from fact pleading. However, two new specific misunderstandings of nonconclusory-andplausible pleading have sprung from it to become mythical corollaries.
Mythical Corollary 1.1: The Nonconclusoriness
Step Draws from Fact-Pleading Doctrine a. Nonconclusoriness Is Key, but Uncertain and Novel. In applying the new test to complaints, a court's determination of which allegations to ignore as conclusory will do much of the critical work. As an illustration, Justice Souter in his Iqbal dissent argued that the majority had managed to dismiss the civil rights complaint by rejecting good allegations as conclusory, rather than by playing with plausibility. 64 So, this key step needs definition. As everyone is now realizing, the determination of conclusoriness remains an unclear and undeniably subjective step. Conclusory allegations include any bare assertion that an element of the cause of action exists. 65 But perhaps they will include more. A candidate for conclusoriness would be "deductions of fact," as 
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opposed to more purely factual assertions. 66 The probable end result is that courts will look mainly at what the plaintiff appears to be alleging to have actually happened (before taking those allegations as true and asking whether they generate a plausible inference of liability). 67 But still one will yearn for more definiteness, if possible. A good starting place for pinning down the meaning of nonconclusoriness is to acknowledge that it does not draw its meaning from fact pleading. It is all new-even though fact pleading had a verbally similar prohibition.
68
The code courts literally condemned "legal conclusions," but they did not actually invoke a law/fact line. 69 As always, the pleader was to avoid pleading pure law. 70 Fact pleading went further. The pleader was to avoid legal characterization, in order to leave the test of legal sufficiency as a task for the court.
71
The conclusoriness prohibition thus swept up some mixed questions. It even included fact-heavy assertions, such as an assertion that the pleader was a "holder" of a bond if that was an issue in the case. only by the application of artificial rules of law, it is a legal conclusion."); cf. id. § 405 (explaining that an allegation such as indebtedness might be one of fact in one complaint (say, for goods sold) and a legal conclusion in another (say, to set aside a fraudulent conveyance), depending on whether the law will be applied to the allegation in the lawsuit). But cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text (suggesting the location of the line might depend on how likely the allegation will be in dispute).
69. specific. In application, it was a matter of degree only. 74 A helpful image was that the pleader should not allege a conclusion that the adjudicator had to find to decide the case, but instead should stay one step back from that conclusion. 75 Thus, the conclusoriness test blocked only critical conclusions, the ones on major points. Here is a concrete formulation of that image:
The comparison of an action to a syllogism is a favorite one. It is said that the major premise is a rule of law, not to be pleaded; the minor premise, the facts of the case making the rule of law applicable (these alone are to be pleaded); and the conclusion is the judgment of the court. 76 Moreover, the only effect of pleading a conclusion under the codes was that the court could strike it as surplusage before any testing for legal sufficiency.
77
The conclusory/nonconclusory distinction did not really survive the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Rules did not expressly reject the "legal conclusion" phrase, some early cases did use it.
78
But this usage has become less common over the years. 79 In any event, the prevailing view was that no separate conclusoriness test applied under Rule 8.
80
The court might require more notice occasionally, or more frequently it might treat the case as one that fell under a federal fact-pleading provision.
81 But notice pleading imposed no separate conclusoriness test, by which the court would ignore certain allegations when going through the complaint. There was simply no reason to knock out as surplusage any summarizing conclusions. Consequently, the courts Twombly-Iqbal reverses direction to reinstate its version of nonconclusoriness.
83
But it is not thereby resurrecting fact pleading's conclusoriness. The Court would not be happy with that stunted kind of conclusoriness test, which aimed merely at optimizing the pleading's level of generality.
84
The new nonconclusoriness has a very different aim, which entails knocking out certain allegations in preparation for measuring the complaint's plausibility. There are other differences. Under the new regime, the nonconclusoriness test applies to all allegations, not just to critical conclusions on major points. 85 Moreover, the new screening would not be satisfied by lopping the complaint's surplusage off the top, but instead seeks to excise all sorts of allegations before asking whether to dismiss the complaint. Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. [The Court here quotes Twombly while observing:] Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." . . .
. . . While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 88 I also concede that Justice Kennedy probably derived the term "legal conclusions" from the fact-pleading usage, doing so because the phrase sounds good. And maybe he even thought the modifier was doing some actual work.
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy did not use that phrase to draw a real distinction. He instead used "legal conclusion" in a conclusory way, ironically enough. Henceforth, the label "legal conclusion" will attach to any sort of allegation, legal or factual, that a court can ignore as a matter of law.
Justice Kennedy would of course ignore any legal conclusions, but he was after much more. He also meant to encourage the pleading of facts, but again he meant more. He did not mean to say that a court should ignore only legal statements. Justice Kennedy would reject conclusory factual allegations too. The Iqbal facts themselves best demonstrate this point. Justice Kennedy's opinion parsed the plaintiff's complaint and, viewing each allegation in isolation, held that the following highly factual allegations were mere "legal conclusions" that a court must disregard:
(1) Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller "'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] ' to harsh conditions of confinement 'as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.'" (2) Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of this policy. 
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applying it, he was not applying a law/fact distinction. He was applying only a conclusory/nonconclusory distinction. More generally, a law/fact distinction had nothing to do with the Court's logic or purpose. To knock out the kinds of allegations that the Court wanted to discard, it had to sweep more broadly than conclusions of law. Seldom would a "conclusory" allegation involve only law, as a plaintiff should not even be alleging law. Usually, the kind of "conclusory" allegation disdained by the Court would involve an application of law to fact, but not always. Sometimes, a purely factual allegation would run afoul of the Court's thinking. Indeed, the new test could cut more deeply into fact than did fact pleading: rather than hewing to fact pleading's line between "legal conclusion" and "ultimate fact," the Court's test could sometimes reject an allegation of "ultimate fact" and so insist on the formerly prohibited pleading of "evidence."
90 It seems as if the Court, in a throwback to Pomeroy, wanted to require the pleading of "dry, naked, actual facts."
91
The only way the law/fact divide enters this arena is that the Court has added a test of factual sufficiency to the pleading stage, in addition to the test of legal sufficiency that Rule 12(b)(6) imposed from its beginning and that continues unchanged under TwomblyIqbal.
92
In the application of the Court's new test of factual sufficiency, however, the law/fact divide is irrelevant. It is unavoidably probabilistic in nature. 95 It thus asks whether the assertion is reasonably possible. Although the judge is to weigh the question in light of his or her judicial experience and common sense as applied in the case's particular context, the shock of this subjectivity is lessened by the realization that a reasonable factfinder (or jury) can bring life experience and common sense to bear on the particular case. "Plausibility" in this context does not imply that the district court should decide whose version to believe, or which version is more likely than not. Indeed, the Court expressly distanced itself from the latter approach in Iqbal, "the plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement." As we understand it, the Court is saying instead that the plaintiff must give enough details about the subjectmatter of the case to present a story that holds together. In other words, the court will ask itself could these things have happened, not did they happen. 95. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) ("Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement."); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 ("The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)). But these statements reject only a standard as high as more-likely-than-not. 
Mythical Corollary 1.2: The Plausibility Step Resembles
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and plausibility testing.
97
The plaintiff must state facts in nonconclusory form, subject to Rule 11. 98 The plaintiff need not offer proof. 99 Nor need the plaintiff even try to show that proof is possibly obtainable. Instead, the court must take those facts to be true.
Next, the court must decide whether it thinks that liability is reasonably possible, given those facts. 100 This step is admittedly an artificial and unprecedented sort of decisional task. The precise question for the court, it seems, is whether a factfinder, if it were to accept the pleaded nonconclusory facts, could reasonably find the moving defendant to be liable on the merits of the cause of action.
b. How Plausibility Compares to Summary Judgment.
The plausibility standard appears equivalent to the standard of decision for summary judgment. Admittedly, the Court's phrasing differs slightly, in that summary judgment speaks of "genuine issue" without mention of plausibility.
101 But in essence, both motions ask whether a factual assertion is reasonably possible, or whether a reasonable factfinder could find for the proponent.
102
This equivalence of the standards of plausibility and summary judgment is a significant insight. It has led some commentators, stressing the similarity between the two, to assert that a motion to dismiss after Twombly-Iqbal has become identical to a motion for summary judgment.
103
I think, however, we must recognize that some important differences remain between the two sorts of 97 Most importantly, the latter proceeds without the evidential development and procedural protections applicable upon summary judgment.
104
A difference cutting the other way, but another that keeps the two motions from blending quite as much as some say they do, is the motions' depths of operation. In arguing identity, perhaps the commentators are imagining Twombly-Iqbal to work at the depth that fact pleading did. Fact pleading applied its yearning for appropriate detail to every allegation.
Similarly, summary judgment can burrow down to the fact-by-fact level, as it tests each for reasonable possibility.
By contrast, the new plausibility test for pleading does not apply to everything-it does not apply element-by-element or allegation-by-allegation or fact-by-fact. Instead, Twombly-Iqbal asks no more than whether inferring the moving defendant's ultimate liability on the cause of action is plausible.
105 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 106 The court should look at the alleged merits of the cause of action, and ask whether the existence of all its elements is sufficiently likely.
107
Of course, a dismissing court can focus on the implausibility of one key allegation (such as the existence of an agreement in restraint of trade 108 ), because the implausibility of that one allegation necessarily implies the implausibility of overall liability. Nevertheless, the court's assigned task remains to gauge the convincingness of asserted liability in order to weed out weak claims.
Therefore, at least thus far in the doctrine's development, the new pleading regime tests the plausibility only of the overall or final liability inference. 1937, 1949 (2009) ; see also id. at 1950 (requiring "a plausible claim for relief"); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 570 (requiring "plausible entitlement to relief" or "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face").
107. Curiously, by testing the plausibility of the conjoined string of the cause's elements, Twombly-Iqbal treats the famous conjunction paradox in a way that is at odds with the rest of the law. The Court's innovation further disadvantages plaintiffs, at least in theory, because it is harder to show the requisite probability for a conjunction than for an individual element. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 10, at 1362-65. separate from the merits of liability, as summary judgment can do. Summary judgment can produce judgments for the defendant based on an affirmative defense or a plea to the jurisdiction or in abatement, or even judgments for the plaintiff. It can also produce partial summary adjudication on particular facts.
110
Another way to make this point is to say that Twombly-Iqbal, problematic though it might be, is not as broadly applicable as summary judgment is. Indeed, this kind of overreading of TwomblyIqbal is illustrative of the next myth.
II. MYTH #2: TWOMBLY-IQBAL APPLIES TO ALL PARTS
OF ALL PLEADINGS Many cases and commentators view Twombly-Iqbal as discouragingly broad in application. For example, some courts have talked of Twombly-Iqbal as applying to all pleadings, including those of defendants. Indeed, in the current confusion, many lower courts are applying the new test to affirmative defenses, 111 although their reasoning is largely on the level of "sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." 115 Second, and more importantly then, the Court was establishing a gatekeeping test for people trying to bring a claim into court, an aim that should not bear on the opposing party. The opposing party is not opening a new proceeding, and also defenses probably impose less risk of abuse because less intrusive and burdensome discovery comes with them than with claims. 116 Therefore, on both the doctrinal and the purposive level, Twombly-Iqbal applies only to claimants.
117
The backup test of notice pleading instead applies to defendants' pleadings, as it does everywhere else.
118
For another example of overbreadth, some cases apply Twombly-Iqbal to the plaintiff's threshold allegations. Thus, lower courts are confusingly applying the new test to issues beyond the merits, even to personal jurisdiction 119 or class allegations. 
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This extension reflects the tendency to view the cases as unleashing a free-floating plausibility test for use against any factual assertions, creating the rough equivalent of a preliminary summary adjudication procedure. Yet, Twombly-Iqbal actually says that all nonconclusory allegations are to be taken as true and that the plausibility test is to be applied only to the ultimate inference of liability of the moving defendant on the particular cause of action. 121 The plausibility test should apply only to test the merits of liability, and so should not apply to any other allegations outside Rule 8(a)(2). There is no reason thus far, on the basis of the Supreme Court's pronouncements, to think that Twombly and Iqbal apply to jurisdiction or other threshold matters. 122 Accordingly, a court assumes to be true any allegations of jurisdiction or class members' positions, at least as long as they are nonconclusory-until the jurisdiction or certification decision, when the plaintiff must provide proof. 123 As a pleading matter, if pleading the matter is required at all, the test for such threshold allegations is fair notice. On the other hand, I am saying that pessimism's role should remain cabined. It should serve only as an opinion about the future, not as a basis for contending that Twombly-Iqbal has already decided all these extensions in favor of screening. Critics can sometimes make a bad decision seem worse than it is and sometimes help fulfill their own prophecies of terrible results. 126 Thus, my bottom line is that pessimism can go overboard.
127
I think that Twombly-Iqbal thereby enjoys the fear mongering of its enemies. But still, in adjusting one's pessimistic outlook, one needs to beware falling into the next myth that draws on optimism.
My point, however, is a bit more subtle than to suggest that there is one true path, from which one can fall off to either side, so that being too pessimistic or too optimistic can lead to an overreading or an underreading. Instead, I am saying that this second myth lies in supposing that no limits exist on the scope of Twombly-Iqbal's application to the whole pleading phase. The upcoming third myth is different in kind, as it supposes that the Twombly-Iqbal Court's diffidence in purpose left its rule to govern only certain kinds of cases or promised that other exceptions will save us. Proof of a difference in kind between the two myths resides In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that show how the liquid came to be on the floor, whether the Defendant knew or should have known of the presence of the liquid, or how the Plaintiff's accident occurred. . . . While consistent with the possibility of the Defendant's liability, the Plaintiff's conclusory allegations that the Defendant was negligent because there was liquid on the flood [sic], but that the Defendant failed to remove the liquid or warn her of its presence are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Id. This decision accomplished nothing. The plaintiff thereafter amended to tell a much more specific story, and the case proceeded to discovery.
127 
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in the realization that a determined misreading of the cases could simultaneously fall prey to both.
III. MYTH #3: THE TWOMBLY-IQBAL JUSTICES DIDN'T REALLY MEAN IT
Other judges and theorists, although they may also be unhappy with Twombly-Iqbal, show a more optimistic bent. Finding the Court's position to be encouragingly ambiguous in meaning, they have come up with clever ways to limit and circumvent the opinions.
128
I am not saying these optimists are wrong in their analyses. Indeed, they are among the most insightful analysts working on this problem. Instead, I am merely disagreeing with their optimistic predictions about the future. (Note that I am not even pausing on the biggest myths of all, propagated by those who assert that there is nothing new in these cases 129 or that the Twombly-Iqbal test lay
128. See cases cited supra note 48 (mentioning lower courts' resistance to Twombly-Iqbal); Brown, supra note 65, at 37-41 (reading the plausibility test to measure loosely whether the plaintiff has accurately predicted that the allegations will have evidentiary support); Hartnett, supra note 46, at 507 (suggesting that discovery can proceed, even after Iqbal, while the motion to dismiss is pending); Noll, supra note 41, at 36-37 (arguing that courts, after resolving Iqbal's massive uncertainties, might lead us to a less terrible place than Iqbal's critics fear); Stein, supra note 56, at 302-06 (taking the view that Iqbal was a very special case, which will not change pleading in ordinary cases); Steinman, supra note 41, at 1320-33 (reconciling Twombly-Iqbal with preTwombly authority, and thereby developing a new paradigm of "plain pleading").
129 We now have to adjust to the broad meaning of the Court's holdings, 133 even if some holdouts refuse to do so. 134 How big is the actual impact of the change, out in the world? On the one hand, in the years before Twombly-Iqbal, many pleaders were including tremendous detail, and many observers attributed this practice to the encouragement, if not requirement, of the lower courts. 135 To some extent, notice pleading was already gone. On the other hand, many courts, naturally enough, will still deny motions to dismiss after Twombly-Iqbal. 136 After all, it is true that some dismissals are beneficial. So, it is not wise to proclaim that the sky is falling.
The desire for more precision runs into the facts that no effective empirical work exists yet on the costs or benefits of the new regime, and any empirical study will prove dauntingly difficult to perform. 137 Still, we can safely say that the Court's holdings will necessarily produce considerable effects.
138 Those holdings will lead to motions being made in new situations, and to more expensive motions that will involve both fighting over Any such study looking at the universe of all such motions, however, is apt to understate the effect of Twombly-Iqbal. Obviously, the case-selection effect of litigants' adjusting to the change in pleading law comes into play, because the study is ignoring the cases not filed. In a perfect world, cases like TwomblyIqbal would have no effect on the number of motions or number of dismissals, as both plaintiffs and defendants immediately adjust to the new regime. Plaintiffs not only will gather more facts and plead more facts, but also will sometimes choose not to pursue cases that will fall to Twombly-Iqbal. This means that one should not expect to see major changes in the data-if only the world were perfect.
More subtly, if one were to compile all dismissal decisions, the effects of Twombly-Iqbal would be hard to measure because these precedents apply to only a restricted subset of motions to dismiss (and result in final dismissal for a smaller subset). That is, Twombly-Iqbal will have its bite only in cases in which the plaintiff cannot plead more detail and the plaintiff nevertheless sues without the detail. The other cases will overwhelm and mask the subsets. In other words, the numbers of motions and dismissals might be high enough to conceal any effect of the new regime.
As to the number of motions, I think that Twombly-Iqbal will produce more motions. But there will be lots of 12(b)(6) motions on grounds other than true Twombly-Iqbal grounds, such as legal insufficiency. The only safe conclusion, then, is that the denominator of the dismissal success rate should be suspect.
Meanwhile, as to the number of dismissals, there will be dismissals on those non-Twombly-Iqbal grounds. There will also be some dismissals on Twombly-Iqbal grounds when the plaintiff pleaded too little but can plead more (and probably does so by successful amendment, perhaps while the motion to dismiss is pending or perhaps after the motion is decided). All these usual decisions are going to resemble but dwarf the true bite of Twombly-Iqbal, which involves only those cases that would have succeeded under notice pleading but now definitively fail under the new test.
In sum, when I contemplate the possibility of a relatively noninflated numerator and an inflated denominator in the dismissal success rate, combined with the inevitable case-selection effect, I am left wondering whether any study looking at the numbers of motions and dismissals really could result in anything other than a showing of little impact. Perhaps there is no substitute for looking at a sample of cases filed and unfiled, viewing them from the inside and on a case-by-case basis.
141. 143 or for a supervisor's violation of the civil rights statutes. 144 A subset of these new dismissals, and of decisions not to sue, will entail meritorious suits being defeated because of informational asymmetry. 145 Regret over this last effect conflicts with the wish to dismiss meretricious suits fairly and efficiently, thus making so difficult the policy choices in reforming the pleading system.
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In any event, even if there were no big increase in the numbers of motions or dismissals, the impact of Twombly-Iqbal is big on who we are-in the sense of what sort of access to justice we afford, and to what extent we intend to continue our reliance on private enforcement of the law. 147 
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Optimists might want to believe that the Court did not intend such significant effects. But of late the Justices seem to have entertained steadily an image of meritless claims and discovery being out of control, regardless of that image's accuracy. 148 The Twombly-Iqbal Court has surely demonstrated confusion and poor craftsmanship, but not a wavering or haphazard set of concerns. 149 Much may be wrong with the new line of cases imposing the novel and uncertain test by a faulty legal process, but the cases have revealed a fairly coherent purpose.
In particular, Erickson v. Pardus 150 generated some of the early optimism by overturning a pleading dismissal only two weeks after Twombly. 151 
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William Erickson, as a pro se plaintiff, brought a civil rights claim against prison officials, alleging that they had endangered his life by wrongfully terminating his medical treatment for hepatitis C.
153
After the district court dismissed the complaint on its legal merits, the Tenth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff had pleaded the substantial-harm element in a "conclusory" way. 154 This being in 2006, before Twombly, the appellate court was using "conclusory" in heightened fact pleading's pejorative sense, which worked to the special detriment of prisoner litigation. 155 The Supreme Court summarily vacated the ruling for having departed "in so stark a manner from the pleading standard mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 156 Its action came via a per curiam opinion, 157 which seemed neither fully cognizant of the new Twombly test nor intent on expanding it. The Court cited Twombly for the propositions that notice pleading does not require allegations of "specific facts" and that the "judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." 158 Erickson, this tonic for optimists, deserves a reread after Iqbal. Although it sounded so permissive, it is reconcilable. And to reconcile it, one need not resort to the pro se status of the plaintiff. The key is to recognize that the Erickson Court left the TwomblyIqbal test unaddressed. The Court merely found the detailed allegations not to be conclusory in the old sense, acting just in the way that the Swierkiewicz-Leatherman Court did and further confirming that those cases are still good law. 159 The Court did not WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 need to reach, and so made no reference to, any plausibility test. 160 Thus, Erickson does not mean that weak but appealing cases will henceforth survive. It provides no basis for hope that the Court will cut back on Twombly-Iqbal. There is simply no inconsistency, or even overlap, between Erickson and Twombly-Iqbal. 161 More generally, one might wonder why the Justices in 2002 were willing to leave pleading reform to the rulemakers, 162 but by today they have shifted into revolutionary mode. It is possible that mounting concerns and frustrated waiting finally forced them to take reform into their own hands. More likely, however, is that they are inadvertent revolutionaries. 163 The Court stumbled into the thicket without realizing where Twombly's path would lead. 164 Then in Iqbal, a case that politically speaking had to come out the way it did, the Court momentously decided to stay the course. By its broad wording in this new case, it proceeded to paint itself into a corner. Today, I find it hard to imagine that the Court's current personnel will choose on their own to walk through the wet paint, just to undo a revolution.
In sum, I contend that optimism in resolving the ambiguities and unsettled questions left by Twombly-Iqbal "fails to 'hear the music' in the Court's recent pleading decisions." 165 Hence, I would defend-at least for being realists-those who want to turn to Congress for a cure, 166 or to a rule amendment. 167 
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CONCLUSION
This Article has tried to convey the meaning of the recent eyeopening cases on federal pleading law. To do so, the Article refuted the three leading myths about the Twombly and Iqbal cases and thereby established these three propositions: First, the Supreme Court has not revived code-style fact pleading. This first conclusion implies that the codes' law/fact distinction plays no role in screening allegations under the new test for nonconclusoriness, and it also implies that the courts should not apply the new test for plausibility to each allegation but only to the ultimate assertion of liability. Second, we academics must beware of overstating the scope of the new cases. Their holdings apply only to claimants' pleadings, and indeed only to the claimants' allegations on the merits. Third, we must also beware of reading optimistically the opinions' evident confusions to infer an aimless Court. The Court's rather steady purpose indicates that the Justices now mean business as pleading revolutionaries.
The Twombly-Iqbal regime is a novel and uncertain one, as well as one instituted by an unwise legal process. But at the core, it is clear what the Court is trying to do-which is a good deal more revolutionary than reinstituting fact pleading. The change in pleading, unless somehow undone, represents a truly major development in modern procedure. 
